The questions posed are natural. First, a fundamental part of neoclassical theory of market adjustments resides in the presumption that markets can be unstable. Thus, there is a natural intellectual curiosity about whether or not the presumption is correct. Second, there is a practical motivation for an interest in stability. Multiple equilibria often appear in models, causing difficulty with model specification. The conventional solution to the problem is to discard the equilibria that are unstable under the presumption that unstable equilibria cannot be observed, that is, they are removed from all consideration. It is only natural to ask if this convention is justified. The third question stems from an issue about the relationship between the competitive model of markets and game theory. The most basic principles of economics are being replaced by principles of game theory and related solution concepts. Do phenomena exist in markets that will be very difficult if not impossible to capture with the static solution concepts of game theory? In particular, game theory and the associated concepts of solutions tend to be equilibrium theories, without any accompanying notion of dynamics or equilibration. Thus, since disequilibrium is a primary feature of instability, it is a rather obvious place to look for challenges to the static equilibrium concepts of game theory.
Notice that the motivations for this study are essentially unrelated to parameters that might be found in the U.S. economy, or any other economy, for that matter. The motivations are not about the economy; they are about economics and the underlying principles of economics that we use as tools to understand the economy. At this stage, the investigation is strictly of a laboratory nature. While the study suggests many interesting questions about the nature of markets found in the field, they are not addressed here. For example, the question of the relative frequency or instances of instability are not addressed. Measures that might indicate when a market is perched at an unstable equilibrium are not sought. This study is about the nature of the laws that govern whether or not an equilibrium is stable, and the focus is on the behavior of markets in the laboratory.
Once one decides to look for instability, the neoclassical theory itself suggests where to search. According to the ideas, the curves must have a perverse shape in the sense that the demand curve should slope upward or the supply curve should slope downward. Neoclassical theory also suggests two types of underlying economic circumstances that can produce such perversities. One set of circumstances is related to income effects. Both the famous Giffen good of upward-sloping demands and the labor-leisure tradeoff that produces backward-bending (downward-sloping) supply curves are related to the income effect. A second set of circumstances is related to externalities or external economies, as Marshall called them. On the supply side, downward-sloping supplies are thought to be produced by efficiencies that might be produced by expanding industrial scale. On the demand side, a similarly constituted externality can produce the upward-sloping demand curves that are thought to be produced by preferences such as desires to mimic the behavior of others. This paper employs the second set of circumstances, the use of externalities to create an upward-sloping demand.1 Markets were created in which the value of the units to any one person increased with the level with which the units are purchased by others. The more others do it, the more any particular individual wanted to do it. The general interpretation could be preferences that result in a desire to mimic others or it could be some sort of belief formation process in which the beliefs or expectations of agents about some underlying state of nature ' Experimental studies of externalities in markets have reported that the competitive model works exactly as expected.
(See Plott 1983; Harrison et al. 1987.) are influenced by the buying behavior of other agents. The result of the preference inducement was to create a market that can be modeled as having an upward-sloping market demand curve even though individual demand curves are downward sloping. With such a demand, an opportunity arose to observe whether or not instability presents itself. Based on previous research, a presumption exists that Marshallian stability and not Walrasian stability will be observed. Plott and George (1992) studied markets in which the supply was downward sloping due to a Marshallian externality and found that the Marshallian model of market stability provided the appropriate conditions under which instability could be observed. The Walrasian concept of stability was found to be completely inappropriate for that type of economic environment. Since an upward-sloping demand is a mirror image of the Marshallian downward-sloping supply, the current study is a test of both the replicability and the robustness of the Plott and George experimental results.
The results are easy to summarize. Unstable equilibria can exist in markets. They exist at the intersection of demand and supply, as do other classical market equilibria. Where the perverse curves are due to an externality, the Marshallian model and not the Walrasian model define the conditions under which unstable equilibria exist. The experiments replicate and extend the results previously reported by Plott and George.
Aside from classical discussions, the literature about the possibility of upward-sloping demands is not extensive. Papers by Becker (1991) and Karni and Levin (1994) both addressed issues of fad-like preferences. (For brevity, we will refer to them as B&KL.) Interestingly enough, both sets of authors, B&KL, failed to realize that they were dealing with a classical Marshallian external economy on the demand side as opposed to the supply side. After translation to the demand side, the model of B&KL differs from Marshall and Plott and George (1992) (PG) in only two substantive respects. The first is the structure of the externality and the second is the assumed industrial organization. First, with respect to the structure of the externality, B&KL do not require that the level of market activity be the vehicle that carries the externality, as do Marshall and PG. Instead, B&KL fads allow market demand to be the vehicle of the externality independent of whether or not the demand resulted in trades or whether adequate supply exists. By contrast, the formal representation of the externality used in PG depends on actual volume traded in the market (Marshallian fads). In B&KL fads, the utilities of agents depended on the number of people that want to do something rather than the incidence of them actually doing it, as is the case in Marshall fads and in PG.
Second, with respect to the industrial organization, B&KL assume that there are only a small number of well-informed sellers and many myopic buyers. By contrast, Marshall and PG assume that there is symmetry between the buying and selling sides of the market. The implications of these differences are rather dramatic. Marshall and PG apply the competitive model on the one hand and with it can characterize notions of stable and unstable markets together with possible dynamic adjustment processes. By contrast, B&KL allow the demand side to behave much like competitors, from which a demand function can be derived in the same way that it is derived in this paper. However, that is where the similarity ends. In this paper, the supply is also derived by application of the competitive model. In B&KL, the sellers are fully informed of the behavior of the demand side of the market and are able to solve for various equilibria using standard game theoretic logic. The problem posed by B&KL is then one of selecting the appropriate equilibrium by appeal to solution concepts.
While both sets of authors, B&KL, mention stability, they do not use the term in a classical sense. In fact, it is interesting to note that, to the extent that the term stability makes sense, they identify instability with Walras and not Marshall. Thus, as the data reported in this paper show, the intuitive ideas of instability that they apply are exactly the opposite of what they should use. The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is a review of the two competing models of market adjustment, Marshallian and Walrasian. This section is also used to introduce the major features of the experimental design. Sections 3 and 4 are brief summaries of the formal structure of the externality model and the associated concepts of demand and equilibrium from the point of view of the individual and the market, respectively. Section 5 is a discussion of the market supply functions. Section 6 is an outline of the experimental design and the predictions of the models, given the parameters imposed. Section 7 discusses experimental procedures. Section 8 contains the experimental results. The final section is a summary of the conclusions. An appendix contains forms and instructions.
Marshall, Walras, and the Experimental Strategy
Suppose the market is characterized by an upward-sloping demand such as drawn in Figure  1 , D1D1. This is only a crude approximation of the actual parameters that were induced in the experiment. Exactly how they were induced will be described in later sections. For now, the curve will be used to describe the difference between the Walrasian and the Marshallian models of market adjustment. So the Walrasian model postulates that price adjusts with a speed dictated by the difference between quantity demanded and quantity supplied at the price. The theory is silent about quantity. The Marshallian model postulates that quantity adjusts with a speed dictated by the difference between the demand price and the supply price evaluated at the quantity. The theory is silent about price. Both theories were developed on special "as if" assumptions about the nature of the adjustment process. For example, Marshall assumed a special trading in which the high valued and low cost units trade in sequence. Walras assumed the market was a tatonnemont system. These assumptions allow the theories of dynamics to proceed by observing only one of the variables (price or quantity) while neglecting the other. Of course, the derivative of both F and G is positive. the logic of the experimental design. By beginning with SIS1 parameters, it is possible to discover whether or not the system moves toward one of the several equilibria. If it does, then we will know that the equilibrium of the demand and supply model captures market tendencies and the first two questions will be answered. Then, after the market equilibrates, a supply shift to 2S2 will make the equilibrium unstable according to the dynamics of the model that got it there, if indeed such laws of dynamics are operative. An equilibrium that was previously stable, presumably, has now become unstable. If the market then moves away from the equilibrium to which it had previously converged, then we have answers to questions iii and iv. A possibility exists that market activity will stay at an unstable equilibrium because it is never perturbed away far enough to cause the underlying instability to become operative. After the shift in supply function, the market activity could simply stay at the equilibrium even though it has become unstable. To deal with this possibility the experimental design called for a push to the market. The dynamic model theoretically requires only a small push, but since we have no theory of what might be small, the plan called for something rather dramatic. If, after the shift, the market did not move, the demand would be shifted to D2D2 in Figure 2 . The method of accomplishing this will be discussed in later sections. Briefly summarized, the trick was to allow each subject to operate "as if" the volume of others was at least 15 units; that is, even if the volume of others was less than 15, the subject's payoff was made as if the volume of others was 15. If volume of others was more than 15, then the subject's payment was based on the actual volume. As will be made clear below, the incentives were conditioned on the volume of others (an externality), and the resulting guarantee produced a normal downward-sloping demand up to 15 units of others because there was no externality. Beyond 15, the externality existed so the upward-sloping character was again present. Figure 2 displays D2D2 in the presence of the supply curve S2S2 because this was the supply condition during the only time that the change in parameters was deployed. Under conditions S2S2 and D2D2, the only equilibrium is c, which is stable according to Marshallian principles of dynamics but is unstable according to Walrasian principles of dynamics.
Underlying Theory of Demand and Individual Incentives
The upward-sloping demand curve is the result of an externality. Each individual buyer makes decisions about one's own consumption based on prices and based on expectations about the decisions of others. In terms of the general theory, this relationship is captured by a utility function of the form U(xi,xi_), where xi is own consumption and x_i is the consumption of others. Since the consumption of others may not be known at the time of decision, a distinction is made between x_i and xei, where xe i represents the beliefs of i about the consumption activities of others. Of course, the beliefs could be represented by a probability distribution, but for purposes of these theories, the decision under uncertainty takes a very specialized form.
In a competitive model, each individual attempts to maximize U(xi, x_i) by choosing xi subject to the budget constraint and the beliefs about the activities of others. Given the special forms of beliefs, the problem becomes an attempt to maximize U(xi, Xe,) subject to the budget constraint. As will be made clear in subsequent discussions, the equilibrium of the system will be defined by a rational expectations axiom that requires that all expectations about the behavior of others are accurate; that is, in equilibrium, the rational expectations requirement will be that From an experimental design perspective, the most complicated aspect of individual incentives is the determination of redemption values for buyers because of the externality and resulting fad-like incentives. As any one agent buys more, the marginal value of units to other agents increases. The models of the experimental situation assume that agents prefer more money to less and that money is the only thing that the agents care about; that is, where mi is the amount of money earned by the subject in a given period of the experiment, the incentives on which the model is based are captured by the function Ui(m). If the individual faces a competitive market price P, then the money income of agent i is of the form
where the function Ri(xi, x_i) is the redemption value that the buyer receives from the experimenter.
Instability of Equilibria * D2D2 -----S2S2
The specific functional form used in the experiments is Ri(xi, x_i) = aixi -bxi22 + Cix'X-i, 
Underlying Theory of Demand and Market Parameters
Since all buyers and sellers were in essence given interest-free loans for the duration of a period, they have no budget constraint. In this case, the maximization hypothesis dictates that the buyers will behave as if they were attempting to satisfy the equation aU(mi(xi, xei))/axi = 0. Since utility is assumed to be monotone in money earnings, the hypothesis is that the individual attempts to maximize money income given the beliefs about the transactions of others; that is, the variable x_i is replaced by a different 
Notice that the demand function has a positive slope. The computations in the table differ slightly due to the discrete nature of the units that compose the table.
Market Supply
Parameters supporting two different supply functions are utilized in the experiments. These are seen as SIS, and S2S2 in Figure 1 . The numerical parameters are contained in Table 1 . These curves were induced using standard procedures. An example of a seller's cost sheet is contained in the appendix. As will be explained in the next section, these two different supply functions imply different stability properties when market demand is DID,.
Experimental Design and Model Predictions
The experimental design called for the market to first contain the demand parameters DID, and the supply parameters SIS,. These parameters were to stay in place for period 0 through period 8. Pilots and previous experiments suggested that this was sufficient time to give the system an opportunity to equilibrate at one of the several equilibria. In period 9, the supply curve was shifted to S2S2. The demand curve would remain unchanged at DID, and the supply shift would be implemented in a manner that was undetected by the demand side of the market. The effect of this shift in supply would be to reverse the stability properties of all of the equilibria according to both theories. Thus, all stable equilibria according to a given theory would become unstable according to that theory and all unstable equlibria would become stable (with some exceptions at the extreme and boundaries). Thus, if markets have elements of the dynamics captured by either of the two theories, then prices and quantities would move away from the equilibrium to which they had previously converged, and this to and fro behavior would isolate the nature of the dynamics involved. If no movement took place, if the prices and quantities remained at a possible unstable equilibrium, then the design called for the implementation of demand curve D2D2. This shift in demand would provide a push that could further test the dynamics.
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Experimental Procedures
A total of three experiments was conducted plus pilot experiments. These are indexed by the dates on which the experiments were conducted (021592, 022292, and 030292). Subjects were students at the California Institute of Technology who were recruited for the experiment and were told that they would be paid. The instructions were read to the subjects. Afterward, the markets were opened through a computerized market in the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. All markets were organized as computerized multiple unit double auctions (MUDA), as described in Plott (1991). Subjects were trained to use the computer in electronic markets through the software tutorial programs contained in the general MUDA package. The incentive charts were organized3 such that it is reasonable to assume that the fact that the market demand function was stationary over all periods was public information. The incentive charts of suppliers were such that the supply curve shift could not have been detected by the demand side of the market until it was possibly revealed through the behavior of the market itself.4
Two of the experiments (022292) and (030292) were conducted exactly according to plan, but a mistake made by one of the suppliers in the third experiment (021592) All experiments were conducted under the same format of parameters and parameter changes. The first nine periods (periods 0 through 8) were conducted under supply conditions S,Si. A shift in supply to S2S2 occurred before the opening of period 9 (which was really the 10th period) and remained in place until the end of the experiment. In summary, the experimental conditions were as follows.
Experiment 021592. Periods 0 through 8, supply SIS, was operative, and periods 6 and 7 were skipped; Periods 9 through 19, supply S2S2 was operative.
Experiment 022292. Periods 0 through 8, supply SIS, was operative; periods 9 through 19, supply S2S2 was operative; a guarantee of the volume of others at 15 units was implemented at the start of period 15, thereby changing the demand curve to D2D2. Experiment 030292. Periods 0 through 8, supply S1S, was operative; periods 9 through 18, supply S2S2 was operative.
The different period structure of experiment 021592 reflected the misunderstanding by one subject seller. This seller thought that selling all units listed on the incentive sheet was necessary. Theoretically, this would be interpreted as a substantial shift to the right of S,S1 that moves all interior equilibria to the right. Of course, during the first periods, the high volume (e.g., 40 units) was noticed by the experimenters. However, the possibility that a subject might be confused was not really considered by the experimenters at first. Instead, the experimenters thought that the market had found the stable equilibrium that exists at the point (40, 273). This particular equilibrium would have been very costly to the experimenters, and a decision was made to save money and eliminate periods 6 and 7. If the market was resting at that equilibrium, little was to be learned by letting it continue through the entire planned periods. The subjects were told that, due to a computer problem, periods 6 and 7 would be opened and then immediately closed without trade and that the subjects should simply mark out those periods on the incentive charts.
They were told that the experiment would resume at period 8. Period 8 was chosen because it is one period before the parameter shift to the S2S2 supply curve. While periods 6 and 7 were being opened and closed, a spot check of subject records revealed the confused subject. Thus, before the beginning of period 8, the confusion was discovered and the subject was told that it was not necessary to sell everything. After this, the experiment proceeded as planned. Of course, all subjects had learned from the market in the first several periods that the market could sustain a high volume. In particular, the buyers, who did not know of the supply shift, were aware of the possibility.
Results
The SUPPORT. In both of the central experiments (022292) and (030292) under supply S1S1 before a parameter shift (periods 0 through 8), the time series reveals the convergence to the nearest stable Marshallian (and unstable Walrasian) equilibrium point b at (176, 12). In experiment 02292, the volume is within 2 units of the equilibrium volume of 12 units for the periods 2 through 8 and the average price is within 8 francs (less than 5%) of the equilibrium price of 176 for periods 1 through 8 and within 3 francs (less than 2%) for periods 6, 7, and 8. In experiment 030292, the volume is within 2 units of the equilibrium volume of 12 units for periods 1 through 8 and the average price is within 5 francs (less than 3%) of 176 for periods 2 through 8 and within 1 franc (less than 1%) for periods 7 and 8.
After the supply shift to S2S2, the data in all three experiments converge toward one of the neighboring stable Marshallian (unstable Walrasian) equilibria. In experiment 022292, by period The coefficients reported here were computed by OLS. Using Table 1 , the theoretical demands and supplies were calculated as follows: For the Marshallian model, the observed quantity for the period was used to find the period's theoretical market demand and supply. The Walrasian model was operationalized in a similar fashion, using the average transaction price of the period (rounded to the nearest integer). For both market demand and supply, the maximum quantity for which the induced market demand or supply did not exceed the observed market price was used for D(P) and S(P), respectively. For clarity, an example is the following: For period 3 in experiment 022292, we have that the observed quantity is 14 and the rounded average price is 182, and for period 4 in experiment 022293 we have that the observed quantity is 12 and the rounded average price is 184. These data lead to the reexpressed data, which are used in the regressions reported above, of Q4 -Q3 = -2, P4 -P3 = 2, P(Q3) = 187, Ps ( 13, the average price and volume are (167, 3), and by period 14, the volume is zero, which is near the equilibrium point a' at (154, 0). After the demand shifts to D2D2, the data converge toward the equilibrium c at (248, 30). For the final three periods, the volume is within one unit and the average price is within 11%. During the final three periods of experiment 030292, the volume is within one unit and the average price is within 2% of the equilibrium point c.
In experiment 021592, after the subject's misunderstanding was corrected, the volume is within two units for the final four periods, 16, 17, 18, and 19. The average price is within 5% of the equilibrium point c at (248, 30). QED. The next conclusion is that the Marshallian model, and not the Walrasian model, captures the nature of the equilibration process; that is, the dynamics are Marshallian and not Walrasian since the convergence is toward the Marshallian stable equilibrium points. SUPPORT. The support for this observation comes from experiment 021592 in which a subject was confused for the first few periods. Notice in Figure 6 that the data start with high prices and volume due to the implicit change in parameters of the one supplier. This change, in essence, creates a stable equilibrium until period 8, when the confusion was removed. It is interesting to note that, during period 8, the market is resting at an unstable Marshallian equilibrium. When the shift occurs at period 9, the equilibrium becomes Marshallian stable and, during period 9, the market stays near the equilibrium. However, in order to get to the highpriced equilibrium, the market must move away from the stable Marshallian equilibrium of zero volume that exists at point a' on the boundary. The high-priced stable equilibrium is not sustained. A few data points that are movements away from the stable Marshallian equilibrium take the systems into the unstable ranges. The fall in prices and volume that occurs in periods 10, 11, and 12 represents general movements toward the Marshallian stable boundary equilibrium. Of course, the fact that any volume exists at all during these periods is in defiance of the 
